Tag Archives: God

The Dynamic Now

10 April 2026 By in Philosophy Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

From the time of the ancient Greeks until the Scientific Revolution, physics (physis: nature) and metaphysics (being) were not separate disciplines. For Aristotle, physics was simply the study of being in motion. Nature, soul, cosmos, and causation were all part of one continuous inquiry into what reality is.

Then came Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. With them, physics became measurable, predictable, external, and governed by formal mathematics. Physics stopped asking “Who am I?” and began asking “What can I measure?” Descartes formalized the split as res extensa: extended matter, versus res cogitans: thinking mind. In simpler terms: the external versus the internal, matter versus consciousness.

Newton made physics self‑sufficient by making space and time real, absolute, and mathematical. By the 19th century, physics had become quantitative prediction, and philosophy was pushed into the qualitative: epistemology, ethics, logic, and mind.

Einstein widened the gap before narrowing it again. Relativity merged space and time into a geometric structure, still external and measurable. But by making the observer essential, Einstein inadvertently reintroduced interiority into physics: the qualitative. Quantum mechanics went further: measurement, indeterminacy, and the wavefunction raised questions that belonged as much to metaphysics as to mathematics. The wall between physics and philosophy began to thin.

Into this moment stepped Henri Bergson (1859–1941), a French mathematician turned philosopher, who insisted that time was not merely a parameter of physics but the very foundation of reality.

For ordinary experience and for physics, from a first‑grade pupil to Einstein, time is the measurable dimension in which events occur in sequence. It provides the framework for durations, intervals, and rates of change.

Bergson meant something entirely different. His “time” was not a dimension, not a sequence, not a container for events, and not a parameter for measurement. It was the qualitative continuity of internal transformation; something lived rather than measured. This transformation is not a movement through time but the creative activity of the present itself. The past endures as memory; the future has no being whatsoever. Time does not progress; it continually recreates itself in the act of becoming. Bergson called this durée or duration: the interior form of exterior change.

The difficulty is that Bergson describes this inner transformation using terms that already presuppose time: succession, flow, duration, continuity, change. Charles Peirce, an American scientist, criticized him sharply for this looseness of vocabulary, remarking that “a man who seeks to further science can hardly commit a greater sin than to use the terms of his science without anxious care to use them with strict accuracy.” Peirce’s complaint is well‑aimed. If one is to understand Bergson, one must repurpose his vocabulary and strip away every temporal modifier; no before, no after, no flow, no succession. What remains is not time at all, but a single, indivisible field of internal self‑presence.

To understand Bergson’s “time,” one must first stop thinking temporally, which is only slightly more difficult than understanding quantum mechanics. But not impossible.

A good starting point is the moment he tried to explain his time to the smartest people on the planet: the infamous 1922 debate between Bergson, then 62, and Einstein, then 43, on the nature of time. Bergson argued that time cannot be reduced to measurement; that it is lived, continuous, qualitative. Einstein insisted that time was a physical quantity. Both agreed that Newton’s absolute time was wrong. But contemporary accounts suggest that Bergson “lost” the debate because he tried to redefine time beyond its physical meaning. In truth, it was a misunderstanding of vocabulary between physics and metaphysics; one that damaged Bergson’s reputation for decades.

The next place where Bergson could, and actually did, bury some of the ghosts of 1922 was in the discussion of the wavefunction. Schrödinger introduced the wavefunction in 1926 as a non‑relativistic formulation of quantum mechanics; Dirac later incorporated special relativity into the wave equation. Together these equations form the backbone of quantum theory. The wavefunction is a mathematical construct that assigns a probability amplitude to a particle’s spatial configuration at a given time.

In physics, the wavefunction evolves deterministically and yields probabilities. Its ontological status remains unsettled: is it real, or merely epistemic bookkeeping?

This is where Bergson’s insights into “time” provide an unexpected interpretive framework. He is not endorsing nor opposing Schrödinger’s or Dirac’s equations. He is just responding to the philosophical structure they reveal: a pre‑actual, indeterminate domain that becomes actual only in the creative present.

From a Bergsonian perspective, the wavefunction is a brilliant but limited abstraction. A spatialized map of a deeper, qualitative becoming. It does not represent multiple possible outcomes; it represents a pre‑actual indeterminacy that becomes determinate only through creative emergence. The future is not chosen from possibilities; it is invented. For Bergson, the future does not exist in any mode; not as possibility, potentiality, or structure.

Thus, the multiverse, the probability field, the branching of outcomes; these are abstractions that cannot exist in reality. They are mathematical artifices created to spatialize a pre‑actual, non‑spatial field of becoming. The wavefunction works, but until it collapses into a determinate actuality, it does not describe reality at all. Before collapse, the wavefunction functions in appearance only; it does not participate in being and lacks any ontological presence. Pre‑collapse, Plato would have regarded these mathematical artifices as shadows on the wall.

Physics describes possibilities; Bergson describes creative becoming. Becoming: our exterior view of the interior duration, is continuous transformation without discrete states: a flow in which something is always changing, always mutating, never simply is.

But the clarity of Bergson’s becoming brings us to an unavoidable question: if duration is truly one continuous creative flow, how can it admit the “degrees of tension” he introduces in Matter and Memory? In that work, Bergson describes a hierarchy of durée: a rich, contracted, unified flow in conscious beings; a relaxed, repetitive, almost discontinuous rhythm in inert matter. A person’s duration unfolds at a different rhythm than the rock he holds in his hand. This hierarchy appears to reintroduce the very spatialization he rejects.

Once different beings occupy different points on a graded scale, durée is no longer absolute. It becomes indexed. Quantified. Relativized. This is the point where Bergson’s system becomes unstable. On the surface, he seems to be reintroducing something like the physical time Einstein would recognize: qualitative and relative.

Bergson attempts to soften this contradiction by insisting that these are not different times but different intensities of the same underlying becoming. Ordinary matter is the most relaxed, repetitive, nearly spatialized form of duration; life is a denser, more contracted form; consciousness is the most unified and intense. He never uses the phrase “degrees of consciousness,” because he felt that would imply a measurable scale: a parameter belonging to the physical world. Instead, he speaks of “degrees of tension” to avoid turning consciousness into a quantity.

But this linguistic maneuver creates its own problem. The word tension inevitably suggests a scale, a gradient, a measurable difference. Bergson’s refusal to name it “degrees of consciousness” leaves him with a conceptual conundrum that was entirely avoidable. Had he framed these differences explicitly as an evolutionary transformation of interiority, the hierarchy would have folded naturally into his definition of durée without threatening its unity.

And durée was itself the conceptual result of free will. Free will was the starting point of his entire philosophy. His doctoral dissertation, Time and Free Will, was written to defend the reality of free action against the determinism of mechanistic science. Determinism denies probability because the future is fixed; Bergson denies probability because the future does not exist. His dissertation defends free action by grounding it in the creative invention of the new within the continuous flow of the now.

Duration was the concept he forged to make that defense possible.

Yet in defending free will, Bergson stretches durée beyond what the concept can comfortably bear. A free act, for him, is not a choice among pre‑existing possibilities; it is the undivided expression of the entire accumulated self in the living present. The future does not preexist; it is invented. This move is not logically required by free will itself. Free will does not require a continuous temporal flow; it can be grounded in timeless agency, modal openness, or discrete decision. But it is required by Bergson’s definition of duration as pure becoming. To preserve durée from any hint of spatialization, he eliminates the future entirely. In doing so, he solves one problem while quietly creating another.

This logic rules out Many‑Worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics. A branching multiverse is the ultimate spatialization of time: a library of pre‑written futures. Bergson’s metaphysics rejects this. The present is not a sample from a probability curve; it is a creative act. But by denying the future altogether, Bergson introduces a tension he never resolves: if consciousness creates the future moment by moment, what grounds this creativity? What anchors becoming?

If the future is invented, consciousness participates in creation.

But invention without a horizon risks becoming metaphysically weightless. Augustine avoided this problem by grounding human freedom in God’s eternal now. Bergson rejects Augustine’s solution, but only by stretching durée into a role it was never meant to bear. His “dynamic now” (my term) becomes the creaturely analogue of Augustine’s eternal now: mutable in us, immutable in God; yet he refuses to name the ground that would make such creativity fully intelligible. Still, Bergson’s symmetry has its own beauty: Augustine’s free will rests in an immutable, all‑knowing God in an eternal present, while Bergson’s rests in a consciousness that is mutable, ever evolving, in a dynamic now.

Bergson’s later works deepen this interiority. Memory is not stored in the brain; the brain merely filters and limits it. When he writes that “the past survives as pure memory,” his language misleads, because his “past” is not the past of ordinary usage. It is the accumulated interior continuity of experience carried forward in the living present. Nothing is behind us; everything endures within us. Identity is simply the persistence of this duration. And consciousness, for Bergson, is not a faster rhythm of matter but a qualitatively different participation in becoming, more than a rock not by degree, but by kind. This is the point where durée begins to take on a mystical contour, inheriting the role Augustine gives to God. Bergson places us, and I’m assigning implicit intent here, beneath God’s eternal now in a creaturely dynamic now.

From here, once consciousness becomes the locus of creative invention, Bergson’s system begins to drift toward a metaphysical center he never acknowledges. From the beginning it is moving in lockstep with theology, but he fights it the entire way.

In his Creative Evolution (1907), durée scales upward into the élan vital, an immanent creative impetus driving matter toward richer interiority. Evolution becomes a movement from minimal self‑presence (matter) to maximal self‑presence (consciousness). In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, this ascent culminates in open morality, creative love, and mystical intuition.

But Bergson’s “open morality” introduces a deeper problem. He attributes to exceptional human beings a form of universal, creative love that looks far less like human psychology and far more like the divine charity of Augustine’s God. Bergson insists that open morality is a human achievement, yet he describes it in terms: universal love, boundless generosity, spiritual intuition, that belong not to ordinary human nature but to the perfection of God. If man is inherently self‑interested, as experience suggests, then open morality is not a human category at all. It is the venue of God, not man. In trying to elevate human morality, Bergson quietly imports a divine attribute into human consciousness, stretching his metaphysics beyond what duration can support.

This is not random becoming. It is a continuous intensification of interiority, experience accumulating until the lights turn on. Bergson refused to call this “purpose.” But given his thesis, especially free will, purpose behaves as if it were present. And purpose implies a whom.

In the end Bergson’s theory stipulates; rather than demonstrates, that consciousness requires duration, and from this stipulation the rest of his metaphysics follows with internal logic. But duration does not have to be real. Free will does not require a continuous temporal flow; the future can be open without a qualitative medium of becoming; and consciousness can exist without interpenetrating continuity. Once these alternatives are acknowledged, Bergson’s initial premise loses its necessity.

If duration is real, then becoming is real. If becoming is real, then novelty (creativity) is real. If novelty is real, then the future is open. If the future is open, then free will is real. If free will is real, then the universe is not closed. If the universe is not closed, then creation is real. If creation is real, then the universe has an interior dimension. If the universe has an interior, then the soul is not a metaphor but a structural feature.

The chain is coherent on its own terms, but the first link is conjectural. If duration is not real, then nothing that follows is necessarily false, but none of it flows from duration as the generative principle Bergson requires. His system becomes conditional rather than inevitable.

This is the chain Bergson followed, but he refused to complete the chain. Naming its endpoint would have pushed him into theology, which he resisted for most of his life. Had he completed the argument, his concept of duration may have survived but the color would have changed.

Bergson’s true achievement was to restore the interior as a dimension of reality. He showed that consciousness is not an illusion, that becoming is not reducible to geometry, and that freedom is not a trick of ignorance. But in doing so, he discovered more than he intended. Free will and memory do not require duration. Élan vital behaves as if it were fulfilling purpose. Open morality exceeds the human and borders on the divine.

The soul is interior, and consciousness is the soul. But interiority does not require temporal flow. Time belongs to the exterior world, not the interior one. Bergson’s mistake is to treat duration as the ground of consciousness, when in fact duration is only the mode of exterior becoming. The interior is atemporal presence; the exterior is temporal succession. Once this distinction is made explicit, the necessity of duration evaporates. The soul remains real, but it is not a flow. It is an interior identity that does not require time.

In the end, Bergson’s system converges on God, even if he refused to say the word.

Graphic: Henri Bergson by Henri Manuel. George Granthan Bain Collection (Library of Congress). Public Domain.

Sheol, Hades, Gehenna, and Hell

30 January 2026 By in Philosophy, Religion Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

“What I am going to say is not a dogma of faith but my own personal view: I like to think of hell as empty; I hope it is.”  Pope Francis, 14 January 2024.

Few utterances from the papal class have landed with more confusion than Pope Francis’s remark. It is muddled, misleading, and ultimately misconstrued, though with two thousand years of ecclesiastical history, one might find other contenders. To be fair, only two papal statements have ever been deemed infallible: Pius IX’s definition of the Immaculate Conception and Pius XII’s proclamation of the Assumption of Mary. Nearly everything else falls under the category of secular opinion. So secular opinion will have to stand along with my slightly pedantic philosophical flourish on the topic.

The trouble with Francis’s remark is not that it expresses hope in an infinitely merciful God. It does, and God is. Humans are extravagantly hopeful when it comes to their own stake in the hereafter. But the Pope’s phrasing seems to remove the ultimate incentive to live a moral life. If there is no hell, then there are no boundaries to one’s actions. On its surface, the statement reduces moral teaching and punishment for sin to negligible outcomes. Two millennia of urging humans to keep their souls pure dissipate in an instant. It treats hell as if it were a place one might stroll into and find as empty as a modern mall, then decide to shop elsewhere; Amazon, perhaps. It blurs the line between our desire to avoid suffering and the eschatological reality in which immorality and punishment are tied to free will. Judgment remains inevitable, for better or worse, and forever. The qualifier “I hope it is” reduces judgment to a wish for mercy rather than a real consequence of one’s actions. It also suggests that the Pope is worried not only about your soul but his own. A merciful God will save a repentant sinner, but hoping is an insecure measure of remorse.

In short, Francis managed an exceptionally muddled rendering of the Augustinian and Thomistic view that hell is the final state of a person who refuses the good and closes themselves off to God’s love. To be fair, clarity is difficult when the very word “hell” carries millennia of conflicting meanings, teachings, and eschatological traditions.

This confusion is inevitable because the Christian vocabulary of the afterlife is a translucent overlay of older worlds, cultures, and languages. The Hebrew Scriptures speak of Sheol, a shadowy realm of the dead with no inherent moral judgment, not a prison for the wicked, but simply the condition of being dead. In Christian theology, “[Jesus] was crucified, died, and was buried. He descended into hell.” The “hell” in this line refers to Sheol (often rendered as Hades), the realm of the dead into which Christ entered. His descent breaks open the barrier between death and divine life. In Sheol, He liberates the righteous dead and inaugurates the post‑biblical landscape of heaven, purgatory, and the final hell of separation from God’s love. After this event, Sheol becomes vestigial in Christian thought, a name without a continuing function. Christianity judges the soul immediately and resurrects the body later, whereas Judaism gives the soul varied post‑death experiences but reserves final judgment for bodily resurrection.

In the ancient Greek world, Hades begins much like Sheol: a neutral underworld where all the dead reside. Only the exceptional are diverted: heroes to the Elysian Fields, mythic offenders to Tartarus. Plato’s Myth of Er overlays this older realm with Socratic soulfully infused moral vision: judgment, reward, punishment, and reincarnation. Over time, mythic Hades and Platonic moral Hades blend into a single, more complex vision. Early Judaism and early Greek religion both had neutral underworlds, but the Greeks moralized theirs first. Socrates’ preoccupation with the soul made him less a secular philosopher than a theological pioneer or prophet if you will.

Hell does not take on its later punitive shape until the New Testament’s use of Gehenna, a metaphor drawn from a real valley outside Jerusalem associated with corruption and divine judgment. In the Gospels, Gehenna is a warning, not a mapped realm. Jesus uses it as prophetic shorthand for the consequence of a life turned away from the good. A moral and relational judgment rather than the later imagery of fire, demons, or descending circles. Gehenna is not the fully developed hell of medieval imagination but a symbol of what becomes of a life that refuses the shape of love.

Augustine, in the 4th century, further develops hell as a condition rather than a location. Hell is self‑exclusion: the soul turns away from God and locks itself into disordered love. Suffering arises from the consequences of one’s own choice; separation from the source of all goodness. This state is eternal not because God withholds mercy but because the will can become fixed in refusal. Fire is both real and symbolic: suffering is real, though its mode lies beyond language and expression.

Aquinas in the 13th century builds on Augustine by grounding hell in Aristotelian metaphysics. Hell is the definitive state of a rational soul that dies in mortal sin. The soul’s refusal of God is not only moral failure but a failure of rational nature. Aquinas distinguishes poena damni (the pain of loss) and poena sensus (the pain of sense). At death, the soul’s direction becomes fixed; eternal destiny is determined not by divine wrath but by the soul’s own settled choice. At the resurrection, the body joins the soul in its suffering. William Blake captures this Thomistic vision in his illustration of Dante conversing with the heretic Farinata degli Uberti in the fiery tombs of the sixth circle.

Aquinas provided his near‑contemporary Dante with the moral architecture that allowed hell to shift from concept to vividly imagined landscape. In the Inferno, Dante transforms that architecture into a descending spiral of circles, each calibrated to a deeper distortion of the good and a harsher form of alienation. At the frozen center lies the absolute loss of God’s presence and love. Dante’s genius is giving spatial form to moral trajectory. Sin becomes architecture.

Modern Christians often imagine hell through Dante’s nine circles without realizing it. Levels, tailored punishments, structured descent, these are Dante’s inventions, not biblical categories. Yet his poetic vision has become the default mental picture of what it means to lose God’s love. His circles are not doctrine, but they express a truth the tradition affirms: the more a soul rejects the good, the more it collapses inward, freezing into itself; a thermodynamic loss not of heat but of God’s presence. Dante’s afterlife remains a symbolic map of the soul’s self‑chosen distance from God, shaping imagination long after its theology has been forgotten or more likely, ignored.

By the modern era, hell has traveled a long road: from Sheol and Hades, through Gehenna, into Augustine’s self‑chosen alienation, Aquinas’s metaphysical finality, and Dante’s architectural imagination. Each stage sharpens the moral stakes, but none claims to know the final census of the saved and the lost.

It is here that Hans Urs von Balthasar, the 20th‑century Swiss theologian, offers a different starting point: beauty as the mode of God’s self‑revelation. God becomes visible through form, radiance, and splendor; beauty is the shape of truth and goodness. For Balthasar, salvation is participation in God’s dramatic love: the drama in which God and humanity meet in freedom. Christ is the central actor whose obedience, self‑gift, and descent into the depths of human abandonment open the way for every person to enter divine life. Salvation is aesthetic: God is Beauty, Christ is Beauty made visible, and salvation is the soul learning again to see the Beauty that is God.

Balthasar insists that Christ’s descent into Sheol means no place remains where God is not. Hell remains a real possibility, but God’s love hopes for every person, even as human freedom is never overridden. Salvation is the soul being drawn freely, dramatically, and beautifully into the radiant self‑giving love of the Triune God.

Balthasar offers a final, chastened note: Christians may hope that all will be saved, but they may never presume it. Hope is a virtue; presumption a trespass. Hell remains real, possible, and bound to freedom, yet the Christian stance toward final judgment is not certainty but reverent uncertainty. We may hope that no soul ultimately refuses the good, but we may not claim to know the mind of God. This hope is not optimism; it is the trembling aspiration of the penitent, something beyond the insecure measure of remorse that opened this essay.

In the end, tradition leaves us with a paradox: hell is the consequence of free-will, yet hope is the proper response to divine mercy. Between those two poles, freedom and mercy, the human soul stands. And perhaps that is the only place it can stand: not in presumption, not in despair, but in the narrow space where hope remains possible without ever becoming a certainty. Perhaps this is what Pope Francis, in his inelegant phrasing, was reaching for.

By the time afterlife dogma and secular imagination knock on our modern door, “hell” is less a settled place or concept than a linguistic suitcase and atlas stuffed with conflicting contents and branching paths toward judgment. Hope without presumption is allowed; hiding never is.

Graphic: Chart of Hell by Sandro Botticelli, c1480. Vatican City. Public Domain.

End Times

7 January 2026 By in Biography, History, Philosophy, Religion Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Isaac Newton (1642–1727), remembered as one of the greatest mathematicians and architect of modern physics, devoted more time to theology and biblical study than to science. Among his vast unpublished papers lies a remarkable calculation: Newton believed that the End of Times would not occur before the year 2060. His thesis was not a prediction of hell on Earth, but rather a forecast of the corrupt secular and spiritual powers giving way to the establishment of Christ’s kingdom on earth.

Newton’s notes on prophecy and chronology survive in the Yahuda manuscripts, now housed at the National Library of Israel. For more than a century, these papers were considered “unfit to print” and remained hidden in the English Earl of Portsmouth’s family archives. In 1936, Sotheby’s auctioned off Newton’s theological and alchemical writings for just over 9,000 British pounds or about $1 million in today’s dollars. Abraham Shalom Yahuda, a Jewish polymath and collector, recognized their importance and purchased a large portion, including Newton’s calculations on the End of Times.

Newton was deeply engaged with biblical prophecy, especially the Books of Daniel and Revelation. He believed these texts contained coded timelines of history on into the future. In Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel (published posthumously in 1733), he wrote: “The prophecies of Daniel are all of them related to one another, as if they were but several parts of one general prophecy… The Apocalypse of John is written in the same style and language with Daniel, and hath many of the same figures.”

In Daniel 7:25 and 12:7, and again in Revelation 12:14, “a time” is taken as one year, “times” as two years, and “half a time” as half a year—an interpretation rooted in the Aramaic/Hebrew idiom in which “time” means “year.” Revelation 11:2 and 13:5 describe the same period as 42 months, which equals 3½ years (42 ÷ 12). Revelation 11:3 and 12:6 express it again as 1,260 days, using the Jewish symbolic 360‑day prophetic year (360 × 3.5 = 1,260). Across Revelation 11–13, these expressions appear interchangeably, reinforcing the equivalence.

The 3½‑year duration itself is symbolic: it is half of seven, the biblical number of completeness, and thus represents a period of incompleteness or tribulation deliberately cut short. Cut short because in Matthew 24:22 Jesus states, “Unless those days had been cut short, no flesh would be saved; but for the sake of the elect those days will be cut short.” A full seven would symbolize evil completing its course, but Scripture portrays God as limiting evil’s duration, preserving a some but not all, and interrupting the “full seven” before it reaches completion.

Later interpreters extended this further. Drawing on Numbers 14:34: “a day for a year”; and Ezekiel 4:6, where God again assigns “a day for a year,” they applied the day‑year principle to the 1,260 days, transforming them into 1,260 years.

Newton then sought a historical anchor, a year to start the clock to End Times. He identified 800 AD, when Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the Romans by Pope Leo III, as the beginning of ecclesiastical corruption. For Newton, this coronation marked the fusion of secular and papal power: the fulfillment of Daniel’s prophecy of a blasphemous authority ruling over the saints. Adding 1,260 years to 800 AD produced the year 2060. In his notes, Newton wrote: “The period of 1260 days, if dated from the complete conquest of the three kings A.C. 800, will end A.C. 2060.” (Newton preferred A.C., Anno Christi, in the year of Christ over A.D., Anno Domini, in the year of the Lord.)

Newton also considered 2034 as an alternative. Anchoring the calculation in 774 AD; the year of Charlemagne’s conquest of the Lombards and alliance with Pope Adrian I: 774 plus 1260 equals 2034. The year 774 also coincided with a massive solar storm, sometimes referred to as the Charlemagne Event (stronger than the Carrington Event of 1859), with auroras reaching deep into southern latitudes and temperatures dropping a few degrees. Yet 2060 remained the most consistent date in his manuscripts.

Newton believed that the corrupt powers that would bring about the End of Times was both the papacy and the secular rulers who supported the church. In his manuscripts he clearly identified the papacy as the “little horn” and the “man of sin,” a corrupt ecclesiastical power that had usurped apostolic Christianity. At the same time he perceived that secular rulers were equally part of the apostate system destined to collapse. The ten horns of the Beast were the European kingdoms. Their political power upheld the papal system and thus shared in its guilt and its eschatological fate.

Importantly, Newton did not envision annihilation at the End of Times. He saw 2060 as the end of corruption and the dawn of a new divine order. He cautioned it may end later, but said “I see no reason for its ending sooner. This I mention not to assert when the time of the end shall be, but to put a stop to the rash conjectures of fanciful men…”

Newton feared that false predictions would undermine faith. His calculation was meant as sober interpretation, not sensational prophecy. He emphasized that only God knows the appointed time: “It is not for us to know the times and seasons which God hath put into his own breast.”

Newton’s calculation of the End of Times flows logically from the biblical text, and he treats the prophetic numbers with strict literalism. Yet he interprets the tribulation not as a final, catastrophic episode at the end of history, but as a long historical decline. Slow corruption within secular and ecclesiastical institutions. All culminating in the restoration of true Christianity.

Although Newton’s prophetic writings remained unpublished during his lifetime, the rediscovery of the Yahuda manuscripts in the 1930s revealed the full scope of his vision. He saw the End Times not as annihilation but as transformation: the fall of apostate Christianity, the renewal of true religion, and the establishment of Christ’s kingdom of peace.

Newton’s restrained timing aligns with Christ’s teaching in Matthew 24:36: “But of that day and hour no one knoweth, not the angels of heaven, but the Father alone.” In Christian eschatology, the Second Coming is likened to a Canaanite or Jewish wedding: the Father alone knows the day, the Son prepares a place, and the bride: the Church, must remain watchful. Newton’s calculations were an attempt to glimpse the architecture of prophecy, yet he humbly accepted the unknowable will of God.

Graphic: Isaac Newton by Godrey Kneller, 1689. Issac Newton Institute. Public Domain.

Solution in Search of a Problem

26 December 2025 By in Philosophy, Religion Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

…[God] commanded him, saying: Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat:  But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. Genesis 2: 16-17.  …And the woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold: and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave to her husband who did eat. Genesis 3: 6.  …And to Adam he said: Because thou hast hearkened to the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat, cursed is the earth in thy work; with labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life. Genesis 3: 17.

The command. The Original Sin. The yoke of punishment.

Within the Christian narrative, the Garden of Eden; whether read as fact or parable, is not a catastrophe that condemns humanity but a pedagogical interval in which freedom, purpose, and morality first become visible. Eden is the place where God teaches that a being with a soul cannot thrive in effortless abundance; that freedom requires choice; that purpose emerges only through effort–trial and error, consequence, responsibility, and growth. Original Sin is not an accident but the awakening of the human soul, the moment the lesson begins.

Against this backdrop, William Dembski’s (1960-present) The End of Christianity advances a far more far‑reaching claim: that God imposed suffering and death across the entire 4.5‑billion‑year history of Earth in response to Adam’s sin; an event that, even on the most generous timelines, occurred only a few tens of thousands of years ago. The difficulty with this theory is not merely its scale but its direction. Within the Christian understanding of God’s eternal now, Eden is not an isolated moment but a teaching environment whose possibilities: temptation, failure, growth, are already present to the divine mind. Dembski’s proposal, however, requires suffering to be imposed on the epochs that precede the sin itself. Adam has no predecessors whose guilt could be inherited, and the only antecedent in the narrative is God Himself. This reversal of moral sequence renders the thesis difficult to sustain.

His theodicy survives only at the level of abstraction; once the brush narrows to a single creature or a single moment, the logic collapses. A brontosaurus sinking into Jurassic mud is not a moral agent, nor is a trilobite crushed in a Cambrian landslide. To treat their deaths as the retroactive consequence of a human sin that has not yet occurred is to impose moral causality where no moral subject exists. The moment the argument touches the concrete world: an ecosystem, a predator’s hunger, a tectonic shift, it demands that nature behave like a courtroom, assigning guilt and punishment across epochs that cannot bear such categories.

Nor does the appeal to the serpent resolve the difficulty. To identify the serpent as the origin of evil is to mistake a narrative instrument for a metaphysical explanation. The question is not who tempted Adam, but how the possibility of temptation exists at all within a creation held in the eternal knowledge of God. If evil can arise only through the serpent’s intrusion or Adam’s misstep, then the divine eternity becomes strangely porous, as though God were surprised by a contingency He did not foresee. A coherent theodicy must account for the possibility of evil within the very structure of creation; reducing it to a reptile or a human choice leaves the deeper metaphysical question untouched.

Additionally, he treats death itself as a sin and the result of sin, redefining a creaturely condition as a moral indictment and thereby forcing all pre‑human death into the ledger of Adam’s guilt. Once these premises are set, the argument can proceed only by inverting causality, collapsing divine eternity into creaturely time, and assigning retroactive guilt to a world that existed long before humanity appeared.

A further difficulty remains unaddressed. If God is placed within a temporal sequence, as Dembski’s model requires, then any retroactive application of punishment collapses into divine causation. A temporal God cannot reach backward in time without becoming the direct agent of the suffering He imposes. If Adam’s sin occurs after millions of years of natural history, then all pre‑human suffering occurs before the sin; and if that suffering is nevertheless treated as punishment for Adam, the only possible source of it is God Himself. The attempt to preserve a literal reading of Genesis thus forces the blame for natural evil onto the Creator, a conclusion Dembski never acknowledges and cannot escape.

As the argument unfolds, the incoherence deepens. Dembski appeals to Rabbi Harold Kushner, who resolves the problem of suffering by limiting God’s power, and to Tony Campolo, who suggests that God voluntarily cedes power to human freedom; positions incompatible with a thesis that requires God to exercise maximal power across billions of years to impose retroactive suffering on creation. He suggests that God created a perfect world, that the Son of God somehow disrupted that perfection, and that God was then forced to rewrite the story while it was being undone. Such a view divides the Trinity into competing agents and reduces God’s eternal now to a sequence of creaturely reactions. In attempting to preserve a literal reading of Genesis, Dembski abandons the very doctrines of divine eternity, unity, and immutability that Christianity has always affirmed.

His treatment of Chronos and Kairos only compounds the confusion. He proposes that God creates in Kairos and implements in Chronos, as though the eternal act of God could be divided into a timeless planning phase and a temporal execution phase. But Kairos and Chronos are categories of human experience, not metaphysical compartments within the divine life. By splitting God’s creative act into stages, Dembski collapses divine eternity into creaturely sequence, producing a picture of God who drafts outside of time and then steps into time to carry out the plan. It is a scheme that contradicts both classical doctrine and the logic of his own argument.

The result is a proposal that feels less like a coherent theological model and more like a solution in search of a problem; an attempt to preserve a preferred interpretation rather than a conclusion arising naturally from the metaphysics he invokes. His argument depends on a literal, historical Adam whose single act introduces moral disorder into the entire cosmos, yet he never defends this premise or engages the long tradition that treats Adam as archetype rather than biological progenitor. Nor does he address the scientific evidence that humanity emerged from a population rather than a solitary pair. The entire structure stands on an unexamined foundation.

By contrast, a more coherent theological reading sees Eden as a deliberate environment constructed to teach humanity its telos. God did not create paradise for idle comfort but to reveal that abundance without purpose is not paradise; that safety without responsibility is not fulfillment; that comfort without growth is tedium. The expulsion from Eden is not divine vindictiveness but the extension of the curriculum: a life in which effort–trial and error, consequence, and responsibility become the conditions for virtue. Original Sin is not a permanent stain but the beginning of moral adulthood, an inherited condition whose guilt is washed away in baptism. God does not abandon humanity after the Fall; He immediately promises redemption and sets further boundaries to guide the soul toward righteousness.

In this light, Eden is not the site of global catastrophe but the first classroom of the human spirit. Eden and Adam are not the problem but the beginning of the solution. It is the place where freedom is defined, purpose is revealed, and the long winding road of redemption begins.

Graphic: The Expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise by Benjamin West, 1791. Public Domain

Time not Time

21 December 2025 By in Philosophy, Physics Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Time, life, and physics are inseparably intertwined. Remove time from our lives or our equations and we are left with a null set; a void where very little makes sense, and nothing moves forward or backwards. Birthdays, compound interest, and prison sentences lose their definitions. Einstein’s spacetime, relativity, and the absolute speed of particles all collapse if time is reduced to mere concept rather than a dimension woven into the fabric of the universe.

Time is real, yet not what we think. It is measurable, yet subjective. Physical, yet metaphysical. Created, yet transcended. It is time, and not time.

To confront this metaphysical and ontological puzzle, we must go back and consider how others have wrestled with it. In Book XI of Confessions, Augustine famously writes: “What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one who asks, I do not know.” He knew time intimately yet could not articulate it; a paradox of intuitive knowledge that resists definition.

For Augustine, time is the tension of the soul: distentio animi, stretched between memory, perception, and anticipation. I would go further: time is the unease of the soul, the awareness that our life is not merely sequential but weighted. Each present moment becomes a record, a catalogue of change, where memory and expectation converge upon the ubiquitous now.

From this knotty discomfort, Augustine turns to consciousness. We do not measure existence as an external construct, nor as Einstein’s spacetime, but hold past, present, and future together in awareness. This is the soul’s way of ordering experience: a catalogue of change. An AI approaches memory similarly; not as a flowing timeline but as indexed facts retrievable when relevant. What for humans is the soul’s ledger of experience, for AI is a ledger of durable notes. And yet both remain finite catalogues.

Augustine presses further: God transcends even this. For us, awareness gathers past as memory and future as expectation, but God simply is: beyond sequence, beyond catalogue, beyond event. Time itself began with creation; sequence and change belong only to the created. God exists outside of it, the eternal source from which all temporal becoming flows.

Thomas Aquinas also saw time not as a substance but as a measure: the numbering of motion by before and after. Time, for him, comes into being with creation and is experienced only by mutable beings, for without change there is no succession, and without succession there is no time. Humanity lives within this flow: we need time to give shape to purpose, meaning, and becoming. But God is utterly immutable, without before or after. He does not move from past to future but exists in a timeless presence; eternity as the simultaneously whole possession of life. All times are present to Him at once, not as a sequence but as a single, perfect act of being.

Pope Benedict XVI, following Augustine and Aquinas, insisted that eternity is not endless time but timeless presence. To bind God within sequential time would reduce Him to a creature among creatures. God does not foresee as a prophet would; He simply is, in relation to all times.

This ‘eternal now,’ or what Boethius calls the ‘eternal present,’ expresses his argument that eternity is not infinite duration but the perfect simultaneity of divine presence. God’s knowledge is not ours extended indefinitely; it is categorically different. Thus, free will and an all‑knowing God are not contradictions. According to Boethius, “whatever lives in time lives only in the present,” whereas God lives in the eternal present: totum simul, the all‑at‑once‑ness of divine life.

Where Christian thought places God beyond time, the Greeks placed humanity within two modes of time: Chronos and Kairos. Chronos is quantitative time; measured, sequential, countable. It gives life structure, the frame by which we track change. Kairos is qualitative time; the opportune moment, the ripeness of action, the fullness of meaning. Chronos watches the clock; Kairos watches life. Chronos measures duration; Kairos measures significance.

Together they reveal that time is not merely a dimension we move through but a dual register of existence: one that counts our days and one that gives those days weight.

Time, from ancient philosophers and theologians to modern physicists, has evolved. Theology gives us a God of timeless presence. Newtonian time was absolute, measurable, and continuous. Einsteinian time became relative, elastic, and inseparable from space. Quantum time is probabilistic, discontinuous, sometimes irrelevant. Entanglement seems to ignore time altogether. The arc bends from time to not‑time. From time to timelessness.

If theology gives us the metaphysics of time, physics gives us its language; how time behaves, how it binds itself to matter, motion, and measurement.

The physical story begins with Newton, who imagined time as absolute: a universal river flowing uniformly for all observers. In Newton’s cosmos, time is the silent metronome of the universe, ticking identically everywhere, indifferent to motion or perspective. It is Chronos rendered into mathematics.

But Einstein suppressed that certainty. In special relativity, time is no longer absolute but elastic. It stretches and contracts depending on velocity. Two observers moving differently do not share the same “now.” Time becomes inseparable from space, fused into a four‑dimensional fabric: spacetime. Where motion through one dimension alters experience of the others. The universe no longer runs on a single clock; it runs on countless local clocks; each tied to its own frame of reference.

General relativity deepens the strangeness. Gravity is not a force but the curvature of spacetime itself. Massive objects bend the temporal dimension, slowing time in their vicinity. A clock on a mountaintop ticks faster than a clock at sea level. Time is not merely experienced; it is shaped by mass and speed. It bends under pressure. It is not the absolute we imagine.

If Newton’s time was a river, Einstein’s time is a landscape; warped, uneven, inseparable from the terrain of existence.

Yet even Einstein’s vision wanes at the smallest scales. Quantum mechanics introduces a world where time behaves less like a smooth dimension and more like a probabilistic backdrop. Particles do not trace continuous, classical arcs but inhabit shifting probability fields. Events unfold not deterministically but as clouds of possibility collapsing into actuality when observed.

And then comes entanglement; the phenomenon Einstein called “spooky action at a distance.” Two particles, once linked, remain correlated no matter how far apart they travel. Their states are not merely synchronized; they are one system across space. Measurement of one instantaneously determines the other, as if the universe refuses to let them be separated by distance or by time.

Entanglement suggests that relation is woven deeper than sequence. The universe reveals patterns of connections that seem to operate under different temporal conditions altogether.

And this loosening of temporal order is not confined to the quantum scale; it appears again, in a different register, at the largest scales of the cosmos.

The universe’s expansion gives the appearance of faster‑than‑light recession, not because objects outrun light, but because spacetime itself stretches. And in the vast reaches where dark energy dominates, the very markers of time grow thin. Beyond the realm shaped by matter, time begins to lose its meaning; dark energy becomes a kind of luminous emptiness, a region where temporality itself seems to fade.

But the universe does not remain at its extremes; the very small and the very large fold back into the ordinary world we inhabit.

And yet, when these quantum strangenesses are averaged over countless particles, when probabilities smooth into certainties and fluctuations cancel out, the world resolves once more into Newton’s calm, reassuring, continuous order. The granular becomes smooth. The uncertain becomes predictable. The timeless hints collapse back into the familiar rhythm of clocks and orbits. Newton’s universe reappears not as the foundation of physics, but as its limit; the shape reality takes when the deeper layers approach infinity.

And it is precisely at this limit that physics brushes against theology. For if entangled particles share a state beyond temporal separation, then timelessness is not merely a divine abstraction but a feature of the universe’s foundational structure. Augustine’s claim that God exists outside time finds an unexpected shadow in quantum theory: the most fundamental connections in reality are not mediated by time at all.

Where theology speaks of God’s eternal now, quantum mechanics reveals systems that behave as if they participate in a kind of physical “now” that transcends sequence. Where theology insists that God is not bound by before and after, entanglement shows us correlations that ignore the very notion of before and after.

Physics does not prove theology. But it points toward a universe where timelessness is not only conceivable but woven into the fabric of existence: an image of everything at once: totum simul, a vision that dissolves the moment we try to picture it.

My Name is Legion

9 June 2025 By in History, Religion Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Beelzebub has been wandering through western civilization since the Philistines appeared on the scene in the 12th century BC. The polytheistic Philistines of Ekron, one of their five cities within Canaan, worshiped Beelzebub, Baal-Zebub in the Philistine language, as a minor god of healing and protection from diseases, mainly from flies. In the semitic languages Beelzebub was literally known as the “Lord of the Flies”. (In Indo-European languages some interpretations suggest that Beelzebub is translated into a more friendly Lord of the Jungle.)

As monotheistic traditions took root in Canaan, Beelzebub shifted from a protective deity to a purveyor of evil, demonized within emerging Jewish thought. By the 9th century BC, the prophet Elijah condemned the Israel King Ahab and the prophets of Baal for worshiping this god rather than the true God of the Jews. By the time of the New Testament, which mentioned him 7 times in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, he was associated with Satan, who represented the emperor of Hell.

In Matthew and Mark, the Pharisees accused Jesus of casting out demons by the power of Beelzebub or the “Prince of the Demons”. Jesus counters by exclaiming that “Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation, and every city or house divided against itself will not stand.” Jesus’ response backed the Pharisees into a corner, if they admitted that Jesus was casting out demons by God’s power, then they would have to acknowledge his divine authority. But if they insisted, he was working with Satan, they would have to explain why Satan would undermine his own influence: a house divided will not stand. (Lincoln in an 1858 speech used the same words with a moral rather than religious meaning, granted that is a very fine line, “A house divided against itself cannot stand,” suggesting that the evils of slavery would lead to collapse of the country.)

Between the 15th and 17th centuries Beelzebub was transformed into one of the seven princes of Hell: Lucifer the Emperor, Satan, Leviathan, Belphegor, Mammon, Asmodeus, and Beelzebub. Beelzebub represented the deadly sins of gluttony and envy.

In modern times Beelzebub remains a symbol of evil in literature and culture. John Milton’s Paradise Lost cast him as a chief demon and William Golding’s Lord of the Flies takes a more ancient meaning associated with corruption and destruction.

From an ancient minor Philistine god to Satan during the times of Jesus, to a major Christian demon in medieval times, back to Satan himself in modern times; Beelzebub’s transformation reflects the shifting religious and cultural landscapes over millennia, but demons will always have a name. In Mark 5:9, Jesus asks a possessed man, “What is your name?” The demon responds, “My name is Legion, for we are many.”

Graphic: Satan and Beelzebub by William Hayley, Jean Pierre Simon, Richard Westall: Paradise Lost. Public Domain.

Divine Right to Rule–Not

13 April 2025 By in History, Philosophy, Politics Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Sir Robert Filmer, a mostly forgotten 17th century political theorist, claimed that kings ruled absolutely by divine right, a power he believed was first bestowed upon Adam.

In his First Treatise of Government, John Locke thoroughly shredded and debunked this theory of divine rights of monarchs to do as they pleased. Locke with extensive use of scripture and deductive reasoning demonstrated that ‘jus divinum’ or the divine right to rule led only to tyranny: one master and slavery for the rest, effectively undermining the natural rights of individuals and a just society.

Filmer, active during the late 16th to mid-17th century, argued that the government should resemble a family where the king acts as the divinely appointed patriarch. He erroneously based his theory on the Old Testament and God’s instructions to Adam and Noah. He used patriarchal authority as a metaphor to justify absolute monarchy, arguing that kings can govern without human interference or control. Filmer also despised democracies, viewing monarchies, as did Hobbes, as the only legitimate form of government. He saw democracies as incompatible with God’s will and the natural order.

Locke easily, although in a meticulous, verbose style, attacked and defeated Filmer’s thesis from multiple fronts. Locke starts by accepting a father’s authority over his children, but, in his view, this authority is also shared with the mother, and it certainly does not extend to grandchildren or kings. Locke also refutes Filmer’s assertion that God gave Adam absolute power not only over land and beast but also man. Locke states that God did not give Adam authority over man for if he had, it would mean that all below the king were ultimately slaves. Filmer further states that there should be one king, the rightful heir to Adam. Locke argues that there is no way to resolve who that heir is or how that could be determined. Locke finishes his argument by asserting that since the heir to Adam will be forever hidden, political authority should be based on consent and respect for natural rights, rather than divine inheritance: a logical precursor to his Second Treatise of Government, where Locke profoundly shaped modern political thought by advocating for consent-based governance.

Source: First Treatise of Government by John Locke, 1689. Graphic: John Locke by Godfrey Kneller 1697.  Public Domain.

Rainbows

18 October 2024 By in Religion Tags: , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

God’s Edenic Covenant with Adam and Eve in which they were promised eternal life and given dominion over the animals stipulated that they were to obey one command: not to eat the fruit from the tree of knowledge (of good and evil).

That didn’t work out well for Adam and Eve, so he made a covenant with Noah after the flood that included seven laws for man to live a just and moral life. With man’s observance, God promised to never destroy the world by flood again.  God sealed the covenant by creating a rainbow.

The seven laws of Noah:

1 – Do not worship false gods

2 – Do not curse God.

3 – Do not murder.

4 – Do not commit adultery or sexually immorality.

5 – Do not steal.

6 – Do not eat flesh from a living animal.

7 – Establish courts of justice.

Source: Seven Laws of Noah by Slon Anava, 2014, Azmut. Graphic: Noahs Dankgebet by Domenico Morelli 1901, Public Domain.

The Ark of the Covenant

7 June 2024 By in History, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Shortly after the Israelites exodus from Egypt around 1500 BC Moses received the Ten Commandments from God who further instructed Moses to have Bezalel build an Ark to house the commandments and He gives specific instructions on how the Ark should be built. Since no pictures are known to exist for the actual Ark, Spielberg’s rendition, built for “Raiders of the Lost Ark” movie, is as good as anything that currently depicts it.

The Ark was initially kept in the ancient Samarian sanctuary city of Shiloh in a tabernacle built under Moses direction and remained there for 369 years.

During the battle of Eben-ezer in 1180 BC the Israelites were defeated by the Philistines, bringing the Ark back to the Philistine pentapolis city of Ashdod, just south of the present-day Tel Aviv, as part of their plunder of Shiloh. Upon capturing the Ark, the Philistines were beset by plagues and misfortune and decided that it would be best to return it to the Israelites.

After its return it eventually settled in Kiriath-Jearim where it remained for about 20 years.  King David eventually brought the Ark to Zion or the City of David. When Solomon succeeded David, he had the Ark brought to his temple in Jerusalem sometime in the 10th century BC, no earlier than 957 BC.

Around 586 BC the Neo-Babylonian Empire destroyed Jerusalem and Solomon’s Temple. After this destruction the Ark disappeared, and its location has been a mystery ever since.

Legends and myths say the Ark was destroyed, or it is currently in Ethiopia, or in the Philistine city of Ekron, or beneath Jerusalem, or on Mount Nebo, or in a cave near the Dead Sea, or the Romans captured it during the Jewish revolts in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, or aliens took it.

Source: Bible. BibleArchaeology.org. Wikipedia. Graphic: Ark from “The Raiders of the Lost Ark”

The Antiquities of the Jews

19 May 2024 By in Biography, History, Religion Tags: , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Josephus’s 20 volume history of the Jews titled: The Antiquities of the Jews was written to provide an account of the Jewish people for his Roman patrons and protectors.

Below is a synopsis of the 20 volumes:

  • Biblical creation to the death of Abraham’s son Isaac
  • History of Isaac’s sons to the Exodus of Jews from Biblical Egypt
  • Exodus from Egypt to the first 2 years of the 40 years in the wilderness
  • The remaining 38 years in the wilderness to the death of Moses upon reaching Canaan
  • Joshua’s replacement of Moses as leader to the death of the priest Eli
  • The capture of the Ark by the Philistines to the death of King Saul
  • David’s ascension to the throne of the Kingdom of Israel to the death of King David
  • Solomon’s ascension as King of Israel to the death of King Ahab
  • Reign of King Jehoshaphat to the fall of Samaria
  • Babylonian captivity of the Jews and the destruction of the Neo-Assyrian Empire
  • Start of the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great to the death of Alexander the Great
  • Death of Alexander the Great to the Maccabean Revolt
  • Origins of the Hasmonean dynasty to the death of Queen Alexandra
  • The death of Queen Alexandra to the death of Antigonus II Mattathias
  • Herod the Great’s taking of Jerusalem to the completion of King Herod’s temple
  • Completion of King Herod’s temple to the death of Herod’s sons
  • Death of Herod’s sons to the banishment of King Archelaus

Josephus history covers major portions of the Old Testament including Genesis, Exodus, Numbers, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Samuel 1&2, 1&2 Kings, 1&2 Chronicles, and Prophets. Josephus’s accounts provide for additional material and commentary not found in other texts including the bible.

Source: Josephus: The Complete Works, 2003. Jewish Virtual Library. World History Encyclopedia. Graphic Joseph, Son of Gorian, by Thomas Emmet, 1880, public domain.