Fed Independence or Not

For more than a century, the independence of the Federal Reserve has been treated as the holy grail of policy dogma. Economists defend it as the firewall shielding monetary policy from the passions of electoral politics and politicians. Journalists speak of it with the same reverence they reserve for constitutional rights. Yet beneath this vow of righteousness and infallibility lies an implicit assumption. That fiat money is a stable, coherent, self‑sustaining system. Once this assumption begins to decay, the entire debate over Fed independence reveals itself as no more than a side-show distraction; a nonsensical argument about who gets to captain a grounded ship.

To understand why, one must begin with the nature of fiat itself. Fiat money is often described as being “backed by the full faith and credit of the government,” and faith is the key word. Fiat is a belief system. Not belief in metaphysical truths or moral principles, but belief in a story. A narrative about competence, stability, continuity, and trust. Fiat works when people believe that the institutions issuing it are capable stewards of their money and future. It works when inflation is low enough to ignore, debt stays at acceptable levels, political institutions appear stable, and the public assumes that tomorrow will be much like today. And, a really big and, above all, the Fed must appear to know what it’s doing. “Forever QE” and transitory inflation are not words of assurance, but policy choices to mask underlying problems.

Belief is the core mechanism to fiat. It is the glue that holds the system together. And it is very, very fragile. Fiat has no basis in physical reality. It is not tied to energy, or production, or land, or gold, or work, or any measurable capacity of the world. It exists entirely on expectations. And the expectations are inherently psychological and political. When the story is coherent and the holders feel safe, fiat, like Plato shadows on the wall remain acceptable and real. When the story becomes visibly illogical with inflation and high debt coming into sharp focus, belief drifts from acceptance to catastrophic loss. Gradually at first, and then suddenly, as Hemingway described bankruptcy. Bankruptcy of everyone all at once.

The Federal Reserve’s role is to maintain the story of competence and solvency. Its tools: interest rates, liquidity operations, forward guidance, balance‑sheet adjustments, do not directly control the real economy. They shape expectations. The Fed is, in a very real sense, the narrator of the monetary story. Its independence is meant to signal that the narrator is trustworthy, competent, that the story is objective, that the governing institution stands above politics. Cutting the federal funds rate on the eve of an election can shatter that trust and illusion of independence in an instant. And when the story itself begins to lose coherence, the independence of the narrator becomes irrelevant. The problem is not who tells the story. The problem is that the story no longer matches people’s experience. At that point, belief collides with reality, and reality wins: holders of paper lose.

Over the past several decades, the narrative foundation of fiat has weakened precipitously. Inflation, once subdued after the Fed Chairman Volcker era, has returned in unpredictable waves. Sovereign debt has grown to levels that strain the imagination. Political polarization has eroded institutional trust and effectiveness. Global supply chains have been revealed as suppressors of the middle-class and gross vulnerabilities to national resilience. Geopolitical tensions have dissipated the assumption of a unified global monetary order. And digital alternatives, however imperfect, have demonstrated that fiat’s monopoly is not certain. Crypto’s rise is not evidence of crypto’s strength; it is evidence of fiat’s weakness. Gold’s relentless upward march mirrors fiat’s decline. Gold is a search for monetary stability: an anchor to stop loss of value in a monetary system. BRICS nations are attempting to offer an alternative narrative, but their proposals remain variations on the same theme. The world is searching for a different narrative, a new anchor, something beyond blind faith.

Both the United States and BRICS are trapped in the same deception: that the future will be won by whoever controls the existing fiat narrative. Each is fighting to preserve a version of monetary primacy that no longer commands the world’s confidence. The deeper problem is not mismanagement but design: fiat systems decay because their value depends on political restraint, institutional credibility, and collective belief. All these factors erode over time. Fiat invites the very forces it claims to contain: short‑termism, opportunism, fiscal excess, and the slow erosion of incentives. Whether issued by Washington or by BRICS, a fiat regime remains vulnerable to the same pressures of politics, greed, and narrative manipulation. The real challenge is not choosing the next steward of fiat but recognizing that the architecture itself guarantees monetary decline and eventual failure.

Gold once provided stability but lacked liquidity; it could not expand fast enough to support a growing credit economy. Fiat solved the liquidity problem but forfeited stability, allowing credit to expand faster than real output. The mechanism changed, but the boom‑and‑bust cycles did not. A century of data shows that recessions occur with almost the same frequency as before. The tools of modern central banking: interest‑rate adjustments, balance‑sheet expansion, crisis intervention, can shape expectations temporarily, but they cannot alter the deeper forces that drive credit economies.

This is why the debate over Federal Reserve independence is the wrong question. Independence gives the Fed room to act, but it does not give it the power to cure the system’s structural instability. Modern monetary policy resembles a doctor endlessly adjusting a patient’s blood‑pressure medication: the dosage changes constantly, the treatment never ends, and the underlying condition remains untouched. When inflation rises, the Fed tightens; when markets wobble, it loosens. These actions contradict each other because they target symptoms, not causes. The Fed cannot control the human impulses that generate leverage, speculation, fear, political pressure, and herd behavior. It can only dampen the consequences, usually at the cost of accelerating fiat’s long‑term decline.

The persistence of recessions before and after the Fed reveals the deeper reality: the problem is not the monetary mechanism but the nature of a credit‑based economy itself. Gold failed because it was too rigid; fiat struggles because it is too flexible; Bitcoin, more commodity than money, will fail for the same reasons gold failed, its supply is perfectly inelastic and its price too volatile. And Stablecoins add nothing new; they are simply fiat in a crypto wrapper. Every architecture confronts the same contradiction: money must be stable enough to be trusted yet elastic enough to support lending, investment, and crisis response. No system has ever resolved this conflict because the real driver of instability is not gold, fiat, or Bitcoin. It is the cycle of human behavior interacting with credit. Until that changes, the mechanism will change its shape, but the outcomes will remain the same.

If fiat is losing its narrative monopoly, what replaces it? Crypto attempted to answer this question with mathematics and a limited supply. Gold answered it with geology and limited supply. Commodity baskets answered it with diversification around hard assets. But none of these fully solve the problem. Crypto is digital gold. Gold is rigid and insufficient for a modern credit economy. Commodities are volatile and become incoherent during panics. Attempting to replace human need with symbols fails every single time.

A deeper insight emerges when you step back and view civilization as a physical system rather than a financial abstraction. The true foundation of economic value is not mathematics, geology, or diversification. It is the capacity to perform work. Work is force or energy moving mass.

Civilization runs on energy generation, energy storage, energy transmission, industrial capacity, logistics networks, and computational infrastructure: organic or silicon. These are the engines of real productivity. They are scarce, measurable, auditable, and grounded in physics. They cannot be printed, inflated, or conjured by policy. They are the physical substrate of economic life. Without energy, life reverts to the stone age before fire. And energy is the force that moves economies. In the financial world, economic work is an incentive force (wages, etc.) producing goods and services.

Money is not merely a measuring stick; it is an incentive field. People work because they receive something in return. Money is barter with flexibility, a universal IOU that aligns human behavior with the physical work civilization requires to survive. Any monetary system that ignores incentives collapses (socialism), because incentives are the bridge between physics and behavior (selfishness). They determine whether capacity is created, maintained, or abandoned.

A monetary system fastened to work‑capacity. The ability of a civilization to perform work in the future. It solves the core problem fiat cannot: it ties money to something the world cannot fake. You can fake a balance sheet. You can fake a narrative. You can fake a token. You cannot fake a gigawatt. That is a first principle: neither arbitrary nor rigid, but physically independent of human interpretation. It scales with civilizational growth. It reflects real productivity. It resists political manipulation. And fraud becomes easy to detect. But only if there is the will to detect it. Most importantly, it aligns incentives with reality: you earn money by increasing the world’s capacity to perform work, not by manipulating symbols.

But a work‑anchored system adopted by even one sovereign does not remain a domestic experiment. It immediately creates pressure elsewhere. A currency tied to audited work‑capacity becomes harder, more credible, and more stable than fiat, and capital begins to migrate toward it. Exchange rates shift. Trade balances distort. Governments that rely on narrative management find their monetary sovereignty constrained by physics. They cannot negotiate with a watt. The result is geopolitical conflict, not because the system is coercive, but because it exposes the gap between a nation’s stories and its real productive base.

In such a system, money becomes a claim on future work. A power plant, a data center, a steel mill, a logistics network, each can issue claims proportional to its audited capacity to perform work. These claims circulate as money. They settle against actual output. Fraud becomes self‑defeating because it cannot survive contact with physics. A plant that over‑issues claims cannot deliver the promised work. A grid that misreports capacity is exposed by its own output. A ledger that attempts to rewrite history is contradicted by the physical world it purports to represent. In this architecture, cheating is not impossible, but it is unprofitable.

The transition from fiat to a work‑anchored system is evolutionary, not revolutionary. It occurs through parallel adoption. A second monetary base emerges alongside fiat. Institutions adopt it for long‑term contracts. Governments recognize it for infrastructure financing. Savings and credit migrate. Fiat becomes a convenience layer, not the foundation. This is not Bitcoin’s adoption curve. It is slower, quieter, and more stable because it is tied to real infrastructure, not speculative enthusiasm. Governments do not adopt it because they want to. They adopt it because the old system stops working for them. They do not lose control. They lose the illusion of control. And that is the real political friction.

Once money is anchored in work‑capacity, the Fed’s role changes fundamentally. It no longer manages inflation, steers the business cycle, manipulates expectations, or performs narrative maintenance. It becomes a clearinghouse, a standards body, a referee, an auditor. Its job shrinks from managing the economy to ensuring the measuring stick is honest. In that world, the debate about Fed independence becomes meaningless. One does not argue about the independence of the Bureau of Weights and Measures. One does not politicize the definition of a kilogram. One does not campaign on the governance of the volt. When money is anchored in physics, not narrative, the central bank becomes a notary, not a priesthood. And the question of its independence becomes as irrelevant as arguing about who should steer the boat when the rudder is missing.

The pointlessness of Fed independence is not a critique of the Fed. It is a recognition that the architecture it manages is reaching the end of its narrative life. Fiat’s fragility is not a failure of policy. It is a failure in its foundation. A work‑anchored monetary system, grounded in the ability of civilization to perform work, offers a path out of the cave of shadows. It replaces narrative with physics, belief with capacity, and discretion with measurement. And once money is anchored in reality, the independence of the storyteller becomes irrelevant. Because the story no longer holds the system together. Reality does.

In the end, every monetary architecture is a story about how a civilization chooses to coordinate work. Fiat coordinates through narrative. Gold coordinates through rigidity. Crypto coordinates through code. A work‑anchored system coordinates through physics and incentives. It does not promise perfection; it promises honesty. It does not eliminate politics; it limits the damage politics can do. And it does not replace human behavior; it aligns it with the real constraints of the world. When money measures capacity instead of belief, the system no longer depends on the storyteller. It depends on the civilization itself.

Fiat creates symbols. Work creates reality.

Postscript: In a work‑anchored system, generators of capacity become profit centers, users become cost centers, and currency becomes a digital ledger of claims and redemptions tied to the physical delivery of work. Taxes take the form of a pure consumption tax or a drawdown of civilization’s work‑capacity. The only form of taxation that aligns incentives, physics, and public finance.

The First Capitalist

Adam Smith, who published his landmark economic treatise The Wealth of Nations in 1776, created an immense tome that spans around 950 pages of incredibly original theory, but it also disparagingly known for its complex language, lengthy, detailed detours, and economic examples that can seem quaint or enigmatic by today’s standards. The book is worth reading but find an abridged version such as The Wealth of Nations: Abridged, CreateSpace, 2011, 150 pages.

His theories for the efficient running of a country’s economy have become the foundation of classical economics, eventually forming the basis for the capitalist economic system. In his book, he introduced concepts such as the invisible hand, free markets, and laissez-faire economics—principles that are widely accepted in the Chicago and Austrian schools of economic thought today.

The Wealth of Nations is divided into 5 books:

  • Economic Efficiency: Discusses the division of labor and how it increases productivity and efficiency in the economy.
  • Accumulation of Capital: Focuses on the importance of savings and investment in driving economic growth.
  • Economic Growth: Examines the factors that contribute to the prosperity of nations, including labor, land, and capital.
  • Economic Theory: Lays out the principles of supply and demand, price mechanisms, and market dynamics.
  • The Role of Government: Argues for limited government intervention, emphasizing the protection of property rights, national defense, and the provision of public goods.

Trivia: Smith never used the word capitalist or any of its derivatives. The first English use of the word “capitalism” is believed to have appeared in the novel The Newcomes by William Makepeace Thackeray. The story follows a banking family and their increasing wealth and admittance into the English aristocracy.

Source: The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith. The Newcomes by Thackeray.

Free Trade

Adam Smith, author of Wealth of Nations, advocated free trade if a country’s savings were increasing, and it produced more than it consumed. He qualified his pro-free trade sentiments by declaring that a country with a low savings rate, producing less than it consumes, and experiencing consistent negative trade balances with its competitors is potentially in for some hard reckoning, including:

  1. Reliance on Foreign Capital: With low savings, a country will have to resort to financing large negative trade balances with foreign lenders, leading to an unhealthy dependency on those countries.
  2. Currency Depreciation: Persistent trade deficits can put downward pressure on the country’s currency value and are potentially inflationary.
  3. Vulnerability to External Shocks: A country with low savings and a negative trade balance is more vulnerable to external economic shocks, leading to economic instability.
  4. Investment Constraints: Limited domestic savings may constrain the country’s ability to invest in infrastructure, education, and other critical areas that support long-term economic growth.

Source: Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith.

Predicting Black Swans in the Market–Not

Bloomberg’s Mark Gongloff postulates that the market’s next Black Swan event will be related to climate change like the Amazon rainforest’s dieback or the permafrost melts and releases all its stored methane and CO2. These events or any catastrophic climate-related event could cause the stock market to lose 40-50% of its valuation. Since we are at it, so could nuclear winter, a 6-mile-diameter asteroid hitting Wall Street or a super volcano blowing Wyoming to the Moon.

By definition, black swan events are not predictable. Some may seem inevitable in hindsight but predicting is difficult especially the future:)

To put a 40-50% climate induced market drops in context, during the great depression the market dropped 83%, 1937-38 just prior to WWII it was 84%, 1973-74 48%, dot.com bubble 49%, mortgage bubble 56.7%, and during covid 34-37%. So, been there, done that, lived through it.

This prediction is based on a study by EDHEC-Risk Climate Impact Institute in London. Gongloff fails to explain how the study reached its market conclusions or what the probability is of the climate events even happening. He just says that the sky is falling.

Gongloff states that a key finding of the study is that climate change damage isn’t priced into the market yet. Gads, this revelation comes from someone working for Bloomberg. The market can’t even price in tomorrow’s JOLTS report much less a possible 2 degree rise in temps by 2100.

‘What if’ scenarios are academically interesting, occasionally, but usually not informative, educational, or worth the resources that produced the study. If a business school could correctly predict Fed interest rate movement for this year rather than forecasting the end of the world in 50 years, I may sit up and listen. Until then–meh.

Source: ‘The Market’s Next Black Swan is Climate Change’ by Mark Gongloff, Bloomberg, 19 July 2024. Understanding Market Corrections by Wes Moss, 2018. Graphic: Black Swan, AI generated, 2024.

No Free Lunch

Henry Hazlitt in 1946 published one of the greatest books on economics ever written: ‘Economics in One Lesson’. It’s concise, lucid, factual, and in respect to deductive reasoning on par with Fredrich Hayek’s ‘The Road to Serfdom’ and Adam Smith’s ‘The Wealth of Nations’.

Hazlitt, like Hayek, was a student of the Austrian school of economics which advocated for minimal government intervention, was against central planning, and believed in gold-standard like currencies.

Hazlitt sums up his short book in one sentence, ‘The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.’ What’s good for the gander is likely not good for the goose.

He expands this thought by showing that economics is about tradeoffs and choices or to simplify it further, when it comes to government spending there is no free lunch. Spending money on guns means less money spent on butter. When President Johnson, in the 1960s after the book was written, tried to spend money on both guns and butter we received inflation. When our current politicians spent unlimited amounts of money on everything imaginable, we received inflation.

History may not repeat itself, but it rhymes.

Source: Economics in One Lesson by Henry Hazlitt, 1946. Graphic: Economics in One Lesson, Hardcover, 2008 Edition, public domain.

Bad Bees

The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices Publick Benefits

By Bernard Mandeville

Commentary and Analysis by F.B. Kaye

Published by Liberty Fund

Copyright: © 1988

Original Book Publication Dates: 1705/1714/1729/1733

Bernard Mandeville was a free thinker, a contrarian, a troublemaker and likely loved every minute of it. His writings on vice and free living were greedily consumed by the 18th century public, and his notoriety began with a simple poem of 433 eight syllable coupled, rhymed lines, a doggerel of no artistic merit but with a moralistic message that has echoed, in various forms throughout the ages. It was originally titled: The Grumbling Hive or, Knaves turned Honest.

Mandeville was born in 1670 in the Dutch city of Rotterdam where he received a classical education at the Erasmus school and a medical degree from the University of Leiden. In the medical field he developed a special interest in what we would now call psychiatry and the use of talk therapy for curing hypochondriacs, the same branch his father practiced. He anticipated Freud by 175 years. Upon completing his medical studies, he moved to London to learn the language and decided to stay. In London he specialized in treating hypochondriacs, stomach ailments, writing political and philosophical tracts, all in which he achieved minor fame and fortune.

Beyond these meager particulars of his early life very little is known about Mandeville’s personal history. To know him, but not necessarily understand him, one must study his pamphlets and books on politics and philosophy and everything he wrote was soaked with politics and philosophy.

Mandeville’s written works sold so well that dozens of editions were needed to keep up with demand. His most celebrated work was The Grumbling Hive which he published anonymously in 1705. This little ditty immediately became a hit with the public and generated an immense amount of discourse and criticism.

Over the next 25 years or so he expanded the poem with commentary and essays under his own name with the next updated edition coming out in 1714 titled: The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices, Public Benefits. In 1923 he again expanded the Fable of the Bees with an essay attacking charity schools, free schools for the poor, as nothing more than a vehicle to assuage the guilty conscience of the rich. The schools, while teaching the basics, the three Rs, were also a forum for instructing young minds in morality and religion. Mandeville was not so much against instructing the kids in addition and subtraction but that teaching morality in a capitalistic society was counterproductive.

Mandeville’s premise was that the rich set up and donated to the schools to atone for their gains attained through vice and greed. Mandeville would likely surmise that today’s charity and political donations, such as George Soros’ funding of weak on crime prosecutors, was atonement for their selfish gains in business and the markets. To put it mildly this did not go well with the upper crust, but it did increase the sales of his books.

In 1728 Mandeville expanded the Fable of the Bees again by adding a second volume which provided additional defense of his thesis that vice is good in the form of dialogs: elaborations on the division of labor and their associated economics. The two volumes were published together in 1733, the year of Mandeville’s death.

Mandeville’s basic thesis underlaying the Fable of the Bees was that greed and vice were good for the economy and society. A person’s self-interest in the pursuit of wealth and luxury provides benefits for everyone. A rising tide lifts all boats. The idea of selfishness for the public good certainly predates Mandeville and continues to the present day. The 1987 movie Wall Street, Gordon Gekko played by Michael Douglas argues that the human march of progress is fueled by personal self-interest and greed. Self-interest to accumulate wealth and fame. Morality does not enter into the equation, or it shouldn’t.

Mandeville believed that vice had a negligible effect on the population, but he obviously understood that it was the gateway drug to harder crimes. He understood that victimless crime led to felonious crime. He understood the “Broken Windows Theory” before it had a name. As such he strongly advocated for a robust and universal system of justice. A system that John Adams in 1779 would codify into the Massachusetts constitution as “a government of laws, and not of men.” By laws Mandeville meant the rules of conduct that private society imposed on itself over centuries of trial and error. He was not prescribing a legislative solution to criminal behavior although he offered advice in that arena also. Rather his economic laissez faire attitude carried over to his thoughts on justice. The fewer government mandates the better. He would readily agree with the 20th century Italian political philosopher Bruno Leoni’s notion on government decrees, “legislation…has come to resemble more and more a sort of diktat that the winning majorities in the legislative assemblies impose upon the minorities, often with the result of overturning long-established individual expectations and creating completely unprecedented ones.”

He emphasized the word justice, as in justice for all, without giving much serious thought to the criminal part of the equation. Mandeville’s endeavors at navigating the differences between vice and crime usually led to ambiguous reasoning and muddy waters. He had a wishful belief in a harmless sort of anarchy where everyone didn’t or shouldn’t bother their neighbors — much. Mandeville was stuck between his belief that selfish behavior is good, and that morality is an illusion, leaving no room for compromise. In the end all behavior could be explained by our selfish desires and motives. Altruistic behaviors were just cover for a guilty conscience.

Mandeville’s intellectual, educational, and philosophical journey, with little supporting evidence other than circumstantial bits and pieces, could be a great case study in nature versus nurture. His father and great-grandfather were both respected physicians with the wherewithal to send him to the best schools in Rotterdam.

His formal education began at the local Erasmus school which gave the students a grounding in Christianity, literature, poetry, drama, art, philosophy, languages, and history with an emphasis on lifelong learning. Desiderius Erasmus, a 15th, and 16th century resident of Rotterdam believed that man could only rise above other animals through self-improvement and study.

Another local resident of Rotterdam that had a profound influence on Mandeville was his contemporary, although a few decades older than himself, Pierre Bayle, a philosopher, and skeptic in the purest sense of the word. Bayle believed Christianity did not have a lock on virtuosity and morality. He believed in religious toleration beyond Catholicism for the simple reason that he was persecuted as a protestant. And he believed that one shouldn’t burden one’s conscience with guilt from minor transgressions or sins of the flesh.

Thomas Hobbes, who died in the same decade that Mandeville was born, was an English polymath best known for his treatise on government and the governed: Leviathan. Leviathan is a discussion on how the individual and societies should be governed, and the covenants between the ruled and the ruler(s) that were needed to hold common-wealth, or as he called it, the Leviathan together. One of Hobbes main points about man as an individual in Leviathan, and which Mandeville was certainly familiar with, was that good and evil were constructs, mere names, for human emotional and physical appetites. The desires that make us human. Morality was nonsense.

26 years after Mandeville’s death Adam Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments where he introduced the concept of the ‘Invisible Hand’, a concept of individual self-interest driving the economic advancement of society. Adams stated, “They (ed. society) are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.” Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’ is practically interchangeable with Mandeville’s self-interest and greed thesis. Smith expanded upon the ‘Invisible Hand’ in his 1976 publication The Wealth of Nations.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments introduced the ‘Invisible Hand’ but was primarily intended to provide logical reasoning for man’s altruistic nature and furnish a rebuttal to Mandeville and others. Adams believed that morality was more than a word, more than an ethical nicety. Smith believed our sense of morality was real and natural. It was built into our being through the experience of living, and he termed it sympathy, what we would now call empathy. It was natural to care about the lives of others either because we have walked in the shoes of the less fortunate, or we can see with our own eyes what the less fortunate are living with or without. Empathy was the laissez faire sense of justice that Mandeville could not see, but should have, because it was in the opposite direction of selfishness. He wouldn’t look there because he believed it couldn’t be found.

Richard Dawkins’ 1976 book The Selfish Gene asserts that a human gene propagates itself into the future through the individual selfish motives of survival rather than through the desire to better a group or organism. The thought that a gene can be selfish is no more plausible than it can run a 4-minute mile, but it is a useful term to use as a descriptor. Dawkins claims that the selfish gene increases its chances of replication and survival by promoting altruistic behavior between like members of a group or organism. The selfish actions of the individual or the gene leads to unselfish actions of the group or the organism.

In the end Mandeville articulated a theory of self-interest driving societal economic advancement that causes emotional discomfort in most of us, not because it is wrong but because it is only half right. We may be selfish, but altruism and benevolence are part of our nature, a major part of who we are. Selfishness and altruism together advance our species and our society.

Bibliography:

  • 1685 de Medicina Oratio Scholastica. Regneri Leers, Rotterdam. An oration in which BM declares his intent to study medicine at Leyden.
  • 1689 Disputatio Philosophica de Brutorum Operationibus. Abraham Elzevier, Leyde. A dissertation delivered at Leyden in 1689, in which Mandeville defended the Cartesian position that animals are unfeeling automata.
  • 1691 Disputatio Medica Inauguralis de Chylosi Vitiata. Abraham Elzevier, Leyden. Mandeville’s medical dissertation in which he argued that digestion involved fermentation, rather than warmth.
  • 1703 Some Fables After the Easie and Familiar Method of Monsieur de la Fontaine. Printed for and sold by R. Wellington, London
  • 1703 The Pamphleteers. A Satyr, London
  • 1704 Æsop Dress’d or A Collection of Fables Writ in Familiar Verse. Printed for R. Wellington, London
  • 1704 Typhon: Or the Wars Between Gods and Giants. Printed for J. Pero, Little Britain
  • 1705 The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turn’d Honest. Printed for S. Ballard and A. Baldwin, London
  • 1709 The Virgin Unmask’d: Or, Female Dialogues Betwixt an Elderly Maiden Lady … Printed, and are to be sold by J. Morphew, and J. Woodward, London
  • 1709 The Female Tatler, by “a Society of Ladies”.  A. Baldwin, London
  • 1711 A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases. In Three Dialogues. Printed J. Tonson, London
  • 1712 Wishes to a Godson, with Other Miscellany Poems. Printed for J. Baker, London
  • 1714 The Mischiefs that Ought Justly to be Apprehended from a Whig-Government. Printed for J. Roberts, London
  • 1714 The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Printed and sold by J. Roberts, London
  • 1720 Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness. Printed, and sold by T. Jauncy, and J. Roberts, London
  • 1723 An Essay on Description in Poetry with A Description of a Rouz’d Lion. Printed in St. James Journal
  • 1723 The Death of Turnus. Printed in St. James Journal
  • 1723 The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Expanded Edition. Printed for E. Parker, London
  • 1724 A Modest Defence of Publick Stews. Printed by A. Moore, London
  • 1725 An Enquiry into the Causes of the Frequent Executions at Tyburn: and a Proposal for Some Regulations Concerning Felons in Prison, and the Good Effects to be Expected from Them. Letters to the British Journal
  • 1729 The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Volume II. Printed and sold by J. Roberts, London
  • 1732 An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War. Printed for J. Brotherton, London
  • 1732 A Letter to Dion, Occasion’d by his Book called Alciphron. Printed and Sold by J. Roberts, London
  • 1733 The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Volumes I and II. London

Readings and References:

(Cover page for The Grumbling Hive from UtahState Digital Exhibits. Cover page for Leviathan from Wikipedia.)